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Abstract:  The  current  EU  is  a  highly  institutionalized  template  for  integration,
equipped with a whole spectrum of different modes of regulation ranging from ‘hard’ 
to  ‘soft’  which,  particularly  in  recent  years,  have  been  pragmatically  combined 
together to develop a hybrid and multi-tiered EU system. 
The dramatic expansion of the EU governance tool-kit and variety of the objectives 
and internal structures of these EU governance tools have relied on a non-clearly 
identifiable mix of legal and policy instruments. These changes in EU governance 
pose a challenge to the rule of law and its main tenets and do not sit well with the 
European  Court  of  Justice (ECJ)  because  they  occupy  an  unsettled  constitutional 
space.    This  space  is  characterized  by  a  range  of  possible  encounters  between 
constitutionalism and governance. New EU governance, therefore, forces European 
scholars to rethink the way the EU system operates and the way Europeanization is 
being pursued.  
The  paper  explores  the  relationship  between  New  Governance,  law  and 
constitutionalism,  the  problems  concerning  their  conceptualization  and  further 
understanding in the context of EU social governance. Its main argument is that a 
stronger dialogue between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ regulatory mechanisms, that is, between 
New  Governance  and  constitutionalism,  may  lead  to  a  hybridized  multi-level 
governance regime in which all governance tools are designed to achieve the same set 
of goals.  
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Introduction 
In  the  last  decade  the  European  Union  (EU)  has  seen  the  emergence  of  new 
approaches to governance other than supranational legal regulation in different policy 
domains, with techniques and enforcement mechanisms ranging from relatively ‘hard’ 
to  ‘soft’  (Scott  and  Trubek  2002).  The  use  of  soft  law  instruments  and  policy 
coordination to advance the European integration process is not a new phenomenon 
(Senden 2004). Soft law encompasses a variety of processes the common feature of 
which  is  that  “while  all  have  normative  content  they  are  not  formally  binding” 
(Trubek, Cottrell and Nance 2006: 65). By setting aside the traditionally perceived 
divide between soft and hard law the paper seeks to interrogate to what extent and in 
what way legal instruments and processes as well as constitutional values and norms
are or may be involved in the operation of “new” modes of governance and what role 
new  approaches  to  regulation have  or may  have  within  the  more  well-defined 
structures of law and constitutionalism. 
Notwithstanding  their  intrinsic  differences,  the  paper  postulates  that  New 
Governance, law and constitutionalism form part of the same corpus unicum, each 
performing  a  specific  role  in  ensuring  the  effective  functioning  of  the  EU  by 
compensating each other’s regulatory deficiencies. In the context of socio-economic 
and  employment  policies,  Hatzopoulos  (2005:  1633)  maintains  that  ‘the  Lisbon 
objectives and recourse to the open method of coordination (OMC) – considered to be 
the paradigm of New Governance - constitute the supplement, in the form of (soft) 
positive  integration,  to  the  (hard)  negative  integration  already  achieved  by  the 
Community judiciary.  […] Seen from this perspective, the lack of legitimacy and the 
absence of judicial control of the Lisbon process, appears far less dramatic.’ 
Thus, by drawing on metaconstitutionalism theories 
1 (Walker 1999) the aim is 
to  reconsider  accepted and  fixed  understandings of  law and constitutionalism  that 
have led to a static and limited juxtaposition of the former and New Governance,
failing  to  grasp  their  multidimensional  meaning and  role  in  the  wider  European 
integration process. While their basic differences cannot  be denied ‘differences in 
historically  shaped  “cultural”  conditions  should  not  be  reified  into  irremovable 
obstacles’ (Nelken 2008: 306). 
The paper, therefore, puts forward an approach to the understanding of law and 
constitutionalism which is procedural, relational and dialogic (Shaw 2000), that is, 
one which enables them to accommodate and interact with New Governance. It is 
posited that such a relationship could then provide the conditions for identifying a 
more  workable  resolution  of  intractable  problems  about  the  EU’s  democracy, 
legitimacy and efficiency gaps. A strong hybridized system of co-regulation could 
also  reduce  the  putative  weakness  of  New  Governance  for  its  lacking  of 
accountability  and  judicial  scrutiny.  In  particular,  with  regard to  the  field  of 
employment,  by strengthening  the  relationship  between  New  Governance  and  EU 
constitutionalism social rights and labour standards could be built into the European 
Employment Strategy (EES) in order to counterbalance that weakness creating the 
basis  for  the  justiciability  of  enacted  measures.  In  this  way  a  space  for  national 
                                                
1 Metaconstitutionalism  is  explored  in  detail  in  the  penultimate  section  of  this  chapter.  Briefly, 
metaconstitutional law is open-textured and it is used to consider the dynamic and multi-faceted nature 
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diversity and experimentation would be preserved and the open method would be 
maintained intact without incorporating it into the “command and control” regulatory 
model  of  EU constitutionalism. Andronico and Lo Faro (2005) identify  one main 
reason for coupling the OMC with fundamental rights. They maintain that while the 
OMC is said to guarantee diversity, fundamental rights are meant to ensure unity. In 
other words, ‘fundamental rights constitute the element of indispensable hierarchy 
which  corrects  the  unsustainable  heterarchy  of  an  otherwise  excessively ‘open’ 
method of coordination’. 
The challenge attendant upon such enterprise is acknowledged from the outset. 
Law and constitutionalism are touched upon by an idea  of “stateness” (Shaw and 
Wiener 2000) which we do not find in New Governance processes. There are also a 
series of other inherent, intertwined and cumulative paradoxes and problems besetting 
the EU and its present and future existence. Each of these encapsulates a weakness or 
limitation of the European integration process, and can also be found in part of the 
copious literature on New Governance. This makes it all the more difficult to establish 
a relationship between these different modes of regulation and to identify appropriate 
normative standards against which to assess the operation and efficacy of new and 
experimentalist modes of regulation in the wider context of EU social governance. 
This explains why, as Weiler and Wind (2003: 3) have put it elsewhere, this paper is 
‘not a contribution as to how to do it, but as to how to think about it’.
Putting New Governance in context 
In  the  current  post-modern  and  post-national  era  and  in  the  context  of  the  EU 
constitutional reform process New Governance practices and processes have reached 
a period of consolidation, some obtaining full recognition with the insertion of new 
provisions in the Treaty. 
2 Abstract questions have become practical questions which 
can no longer be avoided given the place of prominence that New Governance has 
gained over the last decade in European regulation. Although the ToA has provided a 
legal basis for the development of a uniform regulation of social policy at European 
level, a series of questions concerning implementation and compliance have arisen as 
a consequence of the greater reliance on forms of New Governance, which need to be 
taken into consideration in order to understand what role they perform in the EU 
system. An analogy may be drawn between this situation and Vervaele’s (1999: 361) 
metaphor  that  ‘once the house  is ready and  house rules  have been  determined,  it 
becomes more and more important that those rules are complied with and that the 
                                                
2 See e.g. Arts 2(3), 2(5), 5 and 6 TFEU regarding employment and economic policy coordination and 
supporting, coordinating and supplementing measures to the actions of the Member States. The Treaty 
of  Lisbon,  following  the  EU  Constitution,  has  a  separate  category  of  competence  for  economic, 
employment and social matters, Craig (2008:148; see also  Craig 2004:  334-340)  observes that the 
existence of this category was controversial in the Convention on the Future of Europe, with some 
calling for these areas to come within shared competence, while others argued for the inclusion of 
employment and social policy as well as economic policy within this separate category. This second 
solution  prevailed  mainly  for  political  reasons.  If  these  matters  had  been  placed  within  shared 
competence, then the general rules of pre-emption would have been applicable and this was regarded as 
being unacceptable by many. Craig (2008: 148) argues that there may be boundary problems between 
this category and that of shared competence (compare provisions of Article 4 TFEU and Article 5 
TFEU), and that it should be recognized that while this head of competence is framed largely in terms 
of coordination, the detailed Treaty provisions concerning economic policy nonetheless accord the EU 
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house  will  not  be undermined  by inferior  upkeep  or operations  that endanger  the 
structure’.
The emergence of new or experimentalist approaches to EU governance
3 may 
be first explained as a manifestation of wider international processes and phenomena. 
As global trends dismantle barriers, bring about destabilization and in certain ways 
impose changes at domestic level -which will eventually lead to social, economic and 
cultural similarities transnationally- this will bring pressure on law to follow suit. As 
with globalization, so with Europeanization, it makes less and less sense to think of 
“domestic” norms as forming part of distinct national jurisdictions that subsequently 
interact with transnational norms (Nelken 2008: 307). Legal fields are increasingly 
internationalized, even if this process does not affect all fields to the same extent and 
varies by different areas of legal and social regulation. The “denationalization” of 
rulemaking means that transnational public and semi-public networks substitute, to an 
increasing extent, for national fora (Nelken 2008: 307). 
As  a  consequence  the  state  and  public  bodies  have  started  to  “mimic”  the 
practices of private organizational models and to apply market-based management 
theories to achieve the same degree of efficiency of the private sector. Under the 
heterogeneous and complex realities of globally fast advancements, states have come 
to realize that the more flexible and adaptable structure of the private sector should be 
configured  into  their  legal  system.  In  particular,  new  modes  of  governance  have 
already started relying on the use of private sector techniques such as information 
pooling,  learning  by  self-monitoring  and  peer  review,  knowledge  networks  and 
benchmarks for best practices. Lobel (2004: 366) notes that ‘in many contexts, the 
interconnections between the object of regulation (the economy) and the strategy by 
which it is regulated (law) motivate the push for renewal through the adoption of 
market practices in the public sphere.’ This overarching change has established a link 
between contemporary problems in the organization of the economy to innovative 
legal theory on regulation and governance to react to increasing heterogeneity. For 
Cotterell (2007: 147) ‘law is faced with representing or managing difference in legal 
aspirations no less than with promoting similarity in legal experience. Questions about 
national  sentiment  and  diversity  of  cultural  allegiances  are  also  becoming  legally 
significant, (as matters bearing on law’s practical claims to authority) in a far more 
obvious way than in past decades. In a culturally complex world, allegiances (to law 
as to most other embodiments of authority), become complex and multiple’.
Hence,  rule-formulation  and  settlement  increasingly  takes  place  within  new 
forms  of  transnational  governance.  It follows  that  the  governance  paradigm  is  a 
natural successor to the classic regulatory model. Lobel (2004: 365) explains that the 
reason for this is that the governance model ‘addresses the changes in both the goals 
and capabilities of legal regulation, and avoids the central deficiencies of substantive 
law. [It] fundamentally transforms legal control into a dynamic, reflexive, and flexible 
regime.’ This in turn has led to a scenario whereby not only legal techniques have 
become outmoded and the need for change become conspicuously true but also and 
significantly  the  aspirations  of  law  and  policy  have  themselves  undergone 
transformation (Lobel 2004: 364). 
Moreover, the EU forms an integral part of a post-modern trend in international 
capitalism which has reduced the traditional framework of government, increasing 
processes  of  privatization  of  the  law  and  promoting  a  stronger  legal  culture  of 
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new  approaches  to  governance  in  the  United  States  (US),  which  shows  that  there  are  evident 
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th Biennial International Conference – 23-25 April 2009, Los Angeles USA
5
contract. In this context the EU has acquired a unique role acting, on the one hand, as 
a  liberalizing  force  for  international  capitalism,  while  on  the  other  it  acts  as  a 
regulator of capitalist  economic forces. It has therefore followed the tendency for 
transnational systems of governance to experiment with new, less prescriptive and 
less hierarchical ways of regulating. In this context New Governance therefore should 
be  seen  as  a  product  of  the  contingencies  of  history  and  transnationalism  with 
multiple overlapping and conflicting juridiscapes (Appadurai 1996). The blurring of 
the  public-private  divide  within  New  Governance  has  significant  implications  in 
relation to the question of the EU’s polity identity question as it raises questions on 
whether government is public, private or a combination of the two. In this broad and 
fluid “fusion zone” the public sector becomes more open to the dynamics, techniques, 
and language of the market, whereas private actors have to deal with conditions set by 
public authority or integrate broader citizen concerns, on their own initiative and to 
improve their market position often under the banner of corporate social responsibility 
(Smismans 2007: 619-620). 
These systemic changes have significant implications for regulation in the EU 
and the way we study it. They bring to the fore how positivistic images of law based 
on the unity of the nation-state say little about the multi-faceted processes by which 
EU law is formed or the actors involved in decision and policy-making. It follows that 
regulation  in  the  EU  can  no  longer  be  reduced  to  mere  dichotomies  between  a 
supranational and a domestic level of rule-making but rather it should be constructed 
and analyzed as being differentiated and multi-level. As Armstrong (1998: 169-170) 
aptly puts it ‘this more complex picture of governance raises practical and normative 
problems  for  law  in  constitutional  and  administrative  law  terms.  In  short  as 
governance evolves and as actors within different governance regimes or networks 
seek  to  recast  their  conflicts  in  legal  terms,  how  ought  law,  as  an  institution,  to 
approach such issues?’. 
Within the EU context, some of the specific reasons for the way in which New 
Governance has emerged and spread can be related to features of the EU's economic 
constitutional framework and the rigidities of traditional constitutionalism (de Búrca 
2003). With the series of enlargements the EU can no longer ‘sustain the degree of 
homogeneity,  commonality  and  unity  of  purpose  and  method  which  seemed  to 
characterise the earlier Community’ (de Búrca and Scott 2000: 2). Further, the initial 
model  and  ideal  of  European  integration  aimed  at  developing  a  uniform  and 
harmonized  legal  system  has  gradually  started  to  exhibit  vulnerability  as  it  has 
exacerbated and polarized differences between Member States, resulting in various 
degrees  of  disintegration  (Shaw  1996).  The  constitutionalization  of  differentiated 
integration
4 with the Treaty of Maastricht and the manifold path to integration that it 
has fostered rather than leading to a ‘Europe of Bits and Pieces’ (Curtin, 1993) has 
strengthened  rather  than  weakened  the  ability  of  the  EU  to  constantly  evolve  in 
response to changing pressures and new priorities.
More specifically, New Governance is part of the ongoing search for new forms 
and  methodologies  of  integrative  policy-making  and  rule-setting  (Dorf  and  Sabel 
1998; Lobel 2004; Sabel and Zeitlin 2008) and, in broader terms, it represents one of 
the many answers to external and internal challenges which the EU is confronted with
and the outcome of a complex mix of strategic and sectoral politics. Borrowing a 
phrase  by  Walker  (2000:  12)  in relation  to  flexibility,  New  Governance  may  be 
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policies or variations in the level and intensity of participation in European policy regimes’ (Wallace 
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described  as  being  ‘an  ubiquitous  device  which  can  serve  quite  different- even 
diametrically opposed- end games’. In some ways, New Governance may be seen as 
the offspring of all the contradictory urges and pains of the Europeanization process 
and of the EU’s constitutional self-understanding. In this sense, de Búrca (2003: 814) 
talks about the paradoxical nature of the EU’s constitutional system: a fundamental 
tension  between  EU constitutionalism  based  on limited  EU  powers, clarity  in  the 
division of competences between States and the EU, on the one hand and the reality of 
a highly reflexive and pragmatic form of governance entailing the expansion of EU 
activity into virtually all policy fields (which critics define as “creeping competences” 
or “Europeanization by stealth”), a profound degree of competence and power sharing 
between levels and sites of decision-making on the other.
In  particular,  the  birth  of  New  Governance  processes  and  practices  may  be 
explained by several reasons which may be summarized as follows: the reluctance of
Member States to grant the Union further powers or similarly to concede powers in 
very narrow terms. Linked to this and at the same time, various economic pressures 
brought about by globalization,  together with the constraints of the EMU and the 
Internal Market projects have led Member States to rely more heavily on the use of 
coordination in sensitive policy areas where they wanted to maintain their decision-
making powers. Thus, New Governance appeared to provide pragmatic solutions to 
common and  complex  socio-economic problems by  de-politicizing  them  and  by 
sidestepping  obstacles  at  national  level  represented  by  domestic  constitutional 
structures and methods. 
It is also important to emphasize the different functions that European law has 
had within the fifty years of existence of the European Community. In the 1950s since 
European  law  was  conceived  chiefly  as  a  means  of  attaining  largely  economic 
objectives,  the  law  was  conceived  as  ‘law  that  emerged  from the  Community’s 
legislative, administrative and judicial processes rather than law that accounted for
and  explained those  processes’ (Bermann  2001). European  law  has  since  then 
gradually  evolved  into  being  more  than  merely instrumental  to  the  pursuit  of  the 
Internal Market and to Europeanization and increasingly seen as exemplifying the 
various  processes  and  phases  of  European  integration  and  governance.  Post 
Maastricht,  the  legal  debates  have  focused  mainly  on  constitutionalism  issues, 
democratic deficit, European citizenship, transparency, subsidiarity and human rights.
What is striking about recent enlargements (and chiefly the 2004 enlargement) is that 
the very same factors, political, economic and social, which make it in many ways 
unprecedented,  have  not  only  re-focused  attention  on  debates  over the EU’s
constitutional project but also  emphasized law as  an institution with an important 
capacity-building function re-assigning a renewed instrumental role to European law 
in order to enable it to perform problem-solving tasks and to shape the EU’s rule-
making  processes rather  than  being  merely  a  positivistic  manifestation  of  formal 
legitimacy. Recourse to a single process of integration, based on a single structure, 
has  been  made  untenable  by  several  waves  of  enlargement  and  typology  of  new 
competencies which have required an increase in the diversity and flexibility of both 
policy and legal responses. 
The reasons for its emergence offer sustenance to the view that the term “New 
Governance” is a misnomer 
5 and rather than constituting an alternative process to the 
Common  Market  “core”  it  operates  within  the  “constitutional  embrace”  of  the 
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Treaties.
6 The  provisions  on  enhanced  cooperation  inserted  by  the  Treaty  of 
Maastricht, the ToA and the Treaty of Nice 
7 and much earlier in origin scholarly 
notions such as that of “Europe of concentric circles”, “variable geometry Europe”, 
“multi-speed Europe” or “Europe à la carte”
8 all refer to the idea of a non-uniform 
form  of  European  integration  and  implicitly  recognize  the  limitations  of  classic 
European  government.  Recourse  to  minimum  standards  and  harmonization, 
framework legislation and mutual recognition has proved to be an effective method of 
accommodating  diversity  among  Member  States  and  has  had  a  key  role  in  the 
completion of the Single Market. Dougan (2006: 873-874) posits that the growth of 
alternatives  to  total  harmonization  while  being  a  clear  indication  of  a  growing 
resistance to centralization are ‘all phenomena which have grown from within the 
“Community method”, and represent equally valid manifestations of it, rather than 
evidencing its outright rejection or innate weakness’. In particular, the revolutionary 
and avanguard principle of mutual recognition - an ingenious creation of the ECJ’s 
judicial activism and devise to promote European legal (negative) integration- are 
clear examples of alternative forms of regulation to the classic Community Method. 
According  to  Schimdt  (2007)  mutual  recognition  embodies  many  of  the  claimed 
benefits of New Governance as  it allows for  more voluntary acts by the Member 
States than other forms of hard law, more flexibility, decentralization and increased 
public-private  horizontal  forms  of  cooperation.  Hence,  as  in  the  case  of  New 
Governance, mutual recognition responds to the limits of hierarchical government and 
enables  to  accommodate  national  diversity  and  respect  institutional  integrity  and 
political  autonomy  of  its  Member  States  in  all  matters  where  uniformity  and 
centralization  are  not  necessary  or  not  possible  (Scharpf  2001:  13).  ‘Mutual 
recognition often leads to ex-post harmonization and what changes is not so much the 
degree of sovereignty transferred but more how it is transferred, [..] in a decentralized 
manner  by  regulatory  competition…[Mutual  recognition]  could  perhaps  be  better 
identified as a form of horizontal deliberation’ (Poiares Maduro: 2007: 819; see also 
Armstrong 2002a). 
The EU is constantly searching for new ideas on how to “re-dress” its own political 
identity and image and New Governance may be said to represent one of the answers 
to the EU’s democratic deficit/legitimacy crisis. And yet the practices, processes and 
tools which are part of New Governance, the way they operate and the extent to which
they may be said to be effective and, if so, in what way and in relation to what are still 
far from being settled issues. New Governance, therefore, forces European scholars to 
rethink  the  concept(s)  and  the  role(s)  of  law,  the  theories  and  models  of  EU 
constitutionalism, their relationship with “new” modes of regulation and, a fortiori, to 
re-examine the way the EU system operates and the way Europeanization is being 
pursued.  
Despite the growing importance of the New Governance phenomenon in the 
EU, being the focus in the last decade of a considerable volume of investigation and 
analysis (see for example the NEWGOV and CONNEX projects and the database of 
the European Centre of Excellence of the University of Wisconsin on the OMC),
9 the 
legal  dimension  remains  partially  under-explored  having  been  examined  more 
thoroughly  and  in  a  more  structured  manner  only  in  the  last  few  years  (see  for 
                                                
6 Both expressions are borrowed from de Búrca (2000). 
7 See Title VII TEU, Articles 11 and 11a EC. 
8 For some examples of the use of flexibility in the social field see Barnard (2000) and Sciarra (2005). 
9 More  information  about  these  projects  is  available  at:  <http://www.eu-newgov.org>  and 
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example, Barbera 2006; De Schutter and Deakin 2005; de Búrca and Scott 2006; de 
Búrca and Scott 2007). The reduced interest in the legal literature can be explained 
prima facie by the fact that most legal scholars sic et simpliciter fail to recognize the 
relevance of New Governance in the Community legal and judicial system.
New Governance as a threat to the founding pillars of the Community Method 
A reason why many lawyers object to placing greater reliance on the processes and 
practices  of  New  Governance  is  a  more  or  less  explicit  concern  that  “new”  or 
experimentalist approaches to regulation based on horizontal forms of cooperative or 
collaborative  governance  may  undermine  the  foundations  of  the  Community 
Method
10 in that they operate in the shadow of the law and its hierarchy evading the 
democratic controls of parliamentary and judicial scrutiny. In particular, the perceived 
perniciousness of New Governance would result in a reduction of the ‘capacity of law 
to steer, to inform the normative direction of policy, and to secure accountability in 
governance…by virtue of the mismatch between the fundamental premises of law and 
the premises of New Governance’ (de Búrca and Scott, 2006: 5; Walker 2000: 12). In 
this  sense,  Sbragia  (2002)  says  that  governance  in  the  EU  may  be  described  as 
“government  minus”.  In  many  ways  this  comes  with  no  surprise  as  it  is  easily 
noticeable  how  New  Governance  practices  and  processes  (combined  with 
interrogatory  postnationalism  discourses  of  the  EU)  erode  the  comfortable 
relationship  between  law,  constitutionalism  and  European  integration.  This 
“orthodoxy  of  hostility” 
11 towards  New  Governance  propounded  by  those  who 
envisage  only  a  form  of  integration  through  law  based  on  the  “solid  ground”  of 
traditional  constitutionalism  is associated  with  the  fear  that  experimentalism  may 
circumvent pivotal political commitments and constitutional safeguards given that it 
eschews traditional legal mechanisms of accountability, alongside transparency, its 
alter  ego  which  could  further  alienate  an  already  disinterested  and  distrustful 
populace.  Moreover,  there  is  a  concern  that  there  may  be  a  trade  off  between 
democratic  accountability  and  policy  efficiency  (the  input-output  dilemma) 
(Papadopoulous 2007: 484). However, as stressed by Weiler (1995: 232), democracy 
and legitimacy are not “co-terminus”. Legitimacy may be preserved by other values 
other than representative democracy and by substantive policy outcomes rather than 
process (Scott 1998: 176). On this point, Esty (2006: 1515-1523) explores various 
types  of  legitimacy  aside  democratic  legitimacy  -results-based,  order-derived, 
systemic,  deliberative,  and  procedural- which  may  equally  guarantee  a  legitimate 
government or better-said provide a logic for the acceptance of political authority, 
including supranational policy-making even though democratic underpinnings may be 
absent. Moreover, the sources of legitimacy interact in complex ways—reinforcing 
and substituting for each other and at other times being in tension. 
It should also be noted that from a management point of view the EU has grown 
too fast. As Harlow (2002: 171) posits, the peculiar problems of welding together a 
transnational  bureaucracy  have  made  it  hard  to  develop  an  ethos  of  management 
appropriate to the Community Method and, more broadly, to the multi-tiered policy-
                                                
10 In a similar  vein, see Klabbers (1998) on the undesirability of soft law. He maintains that: ‘By 
creating uncertainty at the edges of legal thinking, the concept of soft law contributes to the crumbling 
of the entire legal system. Once political or moral concerns are allowed to creep back into the law, the 
law loses its relative autonomy from politics or morality, and therewith becomes nothing else but a fig 
leaf for power’ (at p. 391). 
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making system of the EU. 
12 By the same token Everson (1998: 196, 201; 214-215) 
argues  that  operating  under  peculiar  EU  conditions  of  constitutional  and  political 
uncertainty administrative law’s traditional role of ensuring the accountability and 
fidelity of delegated legislation is obsolete: accountable to whom, faithful to what? 
Under present conditions EU administrative law is forced to reassess its underlying 
constitutional  logic  and  long-standing  normative  reference  points.  In  particular,  it 
must explicitly move away form its idealized view of “legitimate” administration that 
is predicated upon a narrow vision of current world politics and on the existence of a 
pre-existing  and  unitary  political  will  (of  the  state).  In  turn  this  requires  the 
development of a new set of administrative rules and structures which are sensitive to 
the complex realities of the pluralist and composite European system, reflecting a 
general phenomenon, that is, the crumbling away of the central state at national level 
and the involvement of a multiplicity of both public and private actors. 
13
A quick glance to the present EU will suffice to see that within the European 
Community and precisely in the context of the Community Method there are different 
levels or layers of accountability, be it ex ante or ex post, and different degrees of 
judicial scrutiny both at European and national levels. This system of accountability 
and  judicial  scrutiny  is  far  from  being  perfect.  The  scope  of  the  Commission’s 
relationships with advisory committees and the role which the latter play in national 
governance are already problematic because informal interplay and influence between 
Commission staff and national civil servants or experts are much harder to regulate or 
control. Similarly, the way the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) 
operates  has  also  been  the  subject  of  much  debate  in  terms  of  transparency 
particularly given that most decisions are actually taken by the COREPER before they 
even reach ministerial level. In addition, the Council is not subject to any real form of 
political  ex  ante accountability  at  European  level  but  only  to  ex  post judicial 
accountability, for example through actions for annulment brought before the ECJ 
under Article 230 EC. Although there is a degree of Council responsibility to the 
European Parliament arising out of the co-decision procedure (Article 251 EC), no 
corresponding accountability exists with regard to pillars two and three. In addition, 
even though Council members are politically accountable to their national parliaments 
the Council is not accountable as a single body in the same way that the Commission 
is  to  the  European  Parliament  whose  supervisory  functions  have  increased 
significantly throughout the years (Articles 192-193 EC, 197 EC, 200-201EC, 214 
EC). Moreover, the comitology process under Article 202 EC, through which highly 
technical and complex implementing measures concerning the Internal Market are 
agreed in specialist committees composed of technocrat representatives from Member 
States  and  chaired  by  a  Commission  official,  has  been  the  subject  of  much 
controversy for lacking transparency and accountability (Brandsma et al 2008). As 
co-legislator  it  has  been  rather  difficult  for  the  European  Parliament  to  accept 
implementing measures to be decided in a Council-Commission setting only. Hence, 
further to the introduction of the “regulatory procedure with scrutiny” 
14 the European 
Parliament  may  oppose  to  the  adoption  of  a  Commission  decision  prepared  in 
Committee where it is felt that the matter should be dealt with through co-decision 
(Schusterschitz  and  Kotz  2007).  It  follows  that  if  it  is  difficult  to  accomplish  an 
                                                
12 More  generally Grant  and  Keohane  (2005:  30)  posit  that  in  the  international context  “even  the 
minimal types of constraints [on power] found in domestic governments are absent”. 
13 See  also  Esty  (2006:  1537)  who  identifies  parallels  between  supranational  and  domestic 
administrative law structures. 
14 Council Decision 2006/512/EC, OJ 2006, L 200/11. EUSA 11
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efficient system of accountability within the more traditional mode of regulation it 
becomes even more challenging to develop a model of accountability, be it legal or 
political, that is appropriate to the less formal and less structured processes of New 
Governance. 
On accountability, Mulgan (2000: 555) notes, ‘the word crops up everywhere 
performing all  manner of analytical and  rhetorical tasks and carrying most of  the 
burdens of democratic “governance”’ (see also Bovens 2007). It is invariably equated 
with a strong system of judicial review, the mechanics of law enforcement or the 
principles of procedural due process (legal accountability) and set of procedures of 
governments’  public  control  and  censure  through  elected  institutions  (political 
accountability):  all  elements  which  seem  to  be  absent  in  New  Governance.  The 
Commission’s response to public concern over the extensive and growing use of soft 
law instruments has been to promote democratic self-management in the rule-making
and standard-setting processes, delegating wherever possible to agencies, committees
or social partners in that the rules are made either by those directly interested or by 
representatives of  civil society  by way  of  delegation. The  delegation of  power to 
various independent bodies and agencies (“agencification”) has been justified by the 
need  to  ensure  the  credibility  of  those  entrusted  with  decision  making,  and  this 
credibility  is  deemed  to  be  primarily  safeguarded  through  the  independence  and 
expertise according to the “fiduciary” principle (Majone 2002). The main criticism 
voiced  by  many  lawyers  is  that  it  adds  confusion  as  to  who  should  be  held 
accountable as well as raising doubts about its participatory democracy element given 
the  limited  and  piecemeal  involvement  of  certain  actors  and  stakeholders of  civil 
society. These new actors are, for the most part, excluded from the decision-making 
sphere and are given a more important  role in the implementation side of policy-
making.  In  this  sense,  these  actors  may  clearly  be  seen  as  being  regulatory  and 
legitimacy resources of the EU.
While  the  Commission  together  with  the  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee  has  been  an  advocate  and  promoter  of  developing  a  discourse  on 
participation in European policy-making beyond the traditional route of parliamentary 
politics, a careful reading of the Commission’s White Paper on European Governance
and  its  follow-up  initiatives  shows  that  there  is  a  focus  on  participation  through 
functional  intermediaries and  an absence of  the concept  of  citizenship (Smismans 
2007). In particular, in the White Paper participatory governance has mainly been 
defined in relation to the Community Method  thus confirming the view that civil 
society consultation is used only insofar as it acts as a form of legitimacy token to 
strengthen the Commission’s institutional position (Armstrong 2002) as well as the 
claim that the Commission is clearly restricting the scope of action and intervention of 
participatory ‘new’ governance (Velluti 2003). Moreover, these top-down deliberative 
modes of governance promoted by the Commission have been criticized for reducing 
associative pluralism and intra-organisational diversity, either by imposing an official 
policy paradigm, or by failing to co-opt in governance actors who do not comply or fit 
with it (Wälti and Kübler 2003).
An additional criticism to participation has been its association with a narrow 
conceptualization  of  Union  citizenship.  Since  its  introduction  by  the  Maastricht 
Treaty, the participatory dimension of EU citizenship has mainly been thought of in 
terms  of  electoral  participation.  Further,  while  subsequent  Treaty  reforms  have 
highlighted the nature of participation as a constitutional practice, it seems more apt to 
talk  about  “activated  citizenship”  in  the  sense  that  European  decision-makers  are EUSA 11
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trying to  activate civil  society top-down  to sell the  product, than with real  active 
citizenship (Smismans 2007: 600-601). 
In relation to the EES, Smismans (2005: 116-117) observes that the EES both in
its constitutional and institutional set-up and in its actual working stands far from both 
the standard democratic narrative of representative democracy as well as from the 
democratic  ideal  of  directly  deliberative  polyarchy  (Cohen  and  Sabel  1997).  In 
particular,  ‘it  does  not  provide  the  coherent  institutional  framework  that  can 
encourage decentralized self-regulation in an accountable and democratic way and 
that can ensure interaction between subsystems without subordination of one to the 
other’ (Smismans 2005: 135). 
While  these  concerns  cannot  be  brushed  aside,  the  issues  identified  are  not 
insuperable,  particularly  if  the  aim  is  not at achieving fully-fledged  democratic 
legitimacy  but,  more  modestly,  at  achieving  a  better  functioning  of  supranational 
global  governance  bodies  with  improved  legitimacy (Esty  2006:  1537). Indeed, 
notwithstanding these limitations to experimentalist modes of regulation, it is posited 
here that the extent to which the departure from the procedures of legal and political 
accountability  may  represent  a  serious  weakness  of  New  Governance  will  be 
determined by the extent to which classical modes of accountability are considered as 
being necessary elements of “new” modes of governance and, more broadly, of a 
given transnational polity or system. The answer to this is necessarily linked to the 
vision one has about what constitutes adequate democratic governance in the context 
of European integration and how we conceive of the EU which remains an unsettled 
and vexed issue. In discussing the international rule of law Peerenboom (2009: 4-5) 
neatly summarizes the nature of the problem and the pitfalls one should avoid. He 
observes that ‘most attempts to conceptualize international rule of law are based on an 
analogy  to  domestic  rule  of  law.  Given  the  many  differences  between  sovereign 
nation  states  and  the  international  legal  order,  the  results have  been  fairly 
disappointing.’ ‘Rather than trying to fit square pegs into round holes, it may be better 
to try a radically different approach that does not begin with domestic rule of law as 
the  model.  […]  It  may  provide  a  more  realistic  framework  for  pursuing  the 
possibilities and limits of international rule of law.’
The statal approach would tempt us to prioritize the traditional, statal forms of 
accountability through traditional representative parliamentary institutions and ex post
control by the courts (Harlow 2002: 3). Conversely, the post-national approach would 
lead us to consider the EU as being chiefly a system of transnational governance and 
thus one in which there are “multi-polar” systems of accountability coexisting within 
the  EU  (Hood  1986;  Scott,  2000:  50).  This  is  not  to  say  that  actors  involved  in 
governance  networks  are  not  accountable  at  all.  They  are  subject  to  peer  or 
professional  accountability,  to  reputational  and  market  accountability,  to 
fiscal/financial,  administrative  or  legal  accountability.  There  is  no  guarantee, 
however, that such diffuse or composite control mechanisms can be effective, as they 
operate in a fragmentary and uncoordinated way without forming a coherent system. 
Also, the problem of a lack of political and democratic accountability remains: only 
some network actors are subject to it, and control over them can be merely indirect or 
partial. 
In this model of accountability forms of institutional balance are less closely 
rooted  into  the  institutional  arrangements  of  a  nation  state  which  the  Community 
Method  partially  conforms  to.  According  to  Scott’s  “interdependence  model”  the 
actors are ‘dependent on each other in their actions because of the dispersal of key 
resources of authority (formal and informal), information, expertise, and capacity to EUSA 11
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bestow legitimacy such that each of the principal actors has constantly to account for 
at least some of its actions to others within the space, as a precondition for action’. 
However,  the  problem  with  this  model,  as  mentioned  earlier,  is  that  it  relies  too 
heavily  on  behavioural  pressures  (for  example,  through  moral  commitments  and 
social  or  peer  pressure)  as  a  substitute  for  classical  accountability  (Harlow  and 
Rawlings 2007: 545). This is because mutual accountability networks tend to be more 
concerned with policy input and long-term relationships than retrospective evaluation, 
rendering accountability difficult. 
If  we combine  mutual  accountability  with  classical  democratic  and  political 
accountability it may be possible to develop a model of accountability which may 
improve the democratic accountability of the EU’s multilevel system. 
15 The model 
suggested is largely drawn from the work by Benz and Papadopoulous (2006) and 
Benz (2007). The model is based on a decisional pattern characterized by a functional 
separation of power between policy formulation in networks, and by constituent and 
veto power dedicated to institutions that are authorized and accountable to citizens. 
Formally  authorized  institutions  could  first  set  the  “meta-governance”  (the 
governance of governance networks) procedural rules and administrative tools that 
provide  checks  and  balances  ensuring  inter  alia for  fair  participation  and  for 
accountability in network forms of governance such as for example conflict of interest 
rules, monitoring and audits and lobbying disclosure to avoid clusters of authority 
(see further Esty 2006). Although the formalization of networks (provisions about 
selection  of  participants,  modes  of  operation,  etc.)  may  be  questionable  to  some, 
assigning explicitly the design function to the democratically authorized institutions 
may  reinforce  at  the  same  time  neo-Weberian  expertise-based  legitimacy, 
Habermasian deliberation and Fullerian principles of legality. 
Hence, formally authorized institutions could also have the final say on policy 
outcomes and outputs, by being an effective locus of critical scrutiny over proposals 
formulated  by  governance  networks,  which  have  for  their  part  the  advantage  of 
pooling expertise and of facilitating acceptance by stakeholders. What is being put 
forward is nothing new and we can already find this pattern at both national and EU 
level. Benz and Papadopoulos (2006) suggest increasing the availability of resources 
in  terms  of  legal  instruments  as  well  as  time,  information  intelligence  and 
organization. Hence, at national and regional levels, the constituent and veto functions 
could  be  performed  by  national  parliaments  or  elected  governments.  Actors 
participating in New Governance processes could then have to convince veto players 
about  their  policy  proposals,  while  veto  players  would  be  forced  to  supervise 
participation and policy making in governance effectively. 
                                                
15 See  also  Kingsbury et  al  (2005) and  Krisch and  Kingsbury (2006) who develop  the notions of 
“global administrative space” and “global administrative law”. The first term refers to a multiplicity of 
actors  including  international  institutions  and  transnational  networks,  as  well  as  domestic 
administrative  bodies  that  operate  within  international  regimes  or  cause  transboundary  regulatory 
effects. In this transnationalized context “global administrative law” refers to the legal mechanisms, 
principles and practices, along with supporting social understandings, that promote or otherwise affect 
the accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring these bodies meet adequate 
standards  of  transparency,  consultation,  participation,  rationality  and  legality,  and  by  providing 
effective review of the rules and decisions these bodies make. This is described as “global” rather than 
“international” to emphasize that this is not part of the accepted existing law (lex lata), and to include 
informal institutional arrangements and other normative practices and sources that are not encompassed 
within  standard  conceptions  of  “international  law”. Both  notions  mark  a  departure  from  orthodox 
understandings of international law, in which the “international” is largely conceived as being inter-
governmental, and there is a strict separation of the domestic and the international. EUSA 11
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Within this metagovernance frame we could include what Everson (1998: 214) 
defines  as  a  ‘rule  of  reasons  provision’  which could  serve  as  a  basis for  judicial 
review.  In  particular,  European administrative  law lato  sensu could  be built  upon 
Article 190 EC which provides that decision-making be well reasoned. This provision 
could require that all committees, agencies, private standardization bodies and fixed 
actors within more informal regulatory networks, maintain and make public detailed 
records  of  the  processes  of  decision-making  and  give  access  to  information  and 
documents thus ensuring transparency. In turn judicial review proceedings could be 
triggered by the standing of impartial bodies such as parliamentary committees rather 
than merely by individual locus standi (which would be less likely to succeed given 
the multi-level and heterarchical setting of the EU system). 
16
This  model  could  ensure  a  loose  coupling  of  New  Governance with 
democratically  legitimate  representative  structures  creating  interfaces  that  can  be 
beneficial for mutual learning. Hence, while departing from the classical models of 
accountability,  it would  nevertheless  enable  the  more  nebulous  New  Governance 
practices and processes to operate in a way which may be held more democratically 
accountable and responsive  whilst  ensuring  governability,  policy  efficiency  and 
remaining more representative of public needs and values (Benz and Papadopoulous 
2006; Benz 2007; see also Everson 1998). Moreover, this model of accountability 
would not lead to a return of the same substantive regulatory rationality of command 
and control of the classical forms of regulation. On the contrary, it would preserve 
and strengthen the structure and mechanisms of both classical and experimental forms 
of governance. 
In this context law would retain an important and renewed  role.  As Walker 
observes,  ‘the  very  circumstances  that  challenge  and  dilute  the  problem-solving 
capacity and symbolic authority of law guarantee that it remains a precious currency. 
The problems of coordination and legitimacy of the new flexible order are on such a 
scale that law, with its traditionally vast regulatory potential, will inevitably continue 
to be invoked as a means of containing and resolving crises. Moreover, as a deeply-
layered and richly-resourced repository of traditional and cultural meanings, the legal 
form  retains  a  “legitimacy  credit”  and  a  versatility  even  in  the  face  of  new  and 
apparently discontinuous contexts of political organization and regulation’ (Walker 
2000: 12).  In  a  similar  vein,  Röben  (2003)  maintains  that  the  Union’s 
constitutionalism is stable even if its positive constitutional manifestations are not. 
This is achieved through a specific constitutionalism of the EU as a three-level system 
of government that works through an inverse hierarchy between centre and periphery. 
The state is placed both at the lowest and at the highest level of this system, 
with the Union/Communities at the middle level of government. In the first process, 
the Union forms a hierarchical centre with the Member States acting at the ”lowest 
level”  to  the  extent  the  Community  enacts  policies  in  areas  such  as  the  Internal 
Market and the Member States carry them out. But the periphery also inverts this 
hierarchy with the Member States acting at the “highest level” to the extent that they 
inspire  and  determine the action of  the centre. At this  level of  the  hierarchy,  the 
Member States act through the heads of States and governments assembled in the 
European Council, the national constitutional courts and national parliaments in their 
treaty-making capacity, while at the ”lowest” level, they act through their executive 
organs and their courts. According to Röben this three-level system of government 
ensures that EU constitutionalism may be more capable of resolving the paradox of 
                                                
16 See also Ladeur (1997). EUSA 11
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the deliberate choice for a union of constitutional nations states rather than a federal 
state. 
Röben’s model is exemplified by the operation of the OMC, chiefly in the EES. 
The legitimacy to act of the Member States is bestowed upon them by the European 
Institutions, chiefly the European Council, the Council and the Commission via the 
adoption of Employment Guidelines and Member States have to give account for their 
actions (or inaction) to them upon receipt of recommendations. Governments may 
also have to give account for measures adopted pursuant to the EES to their national 
parliaments. 
There are now sufficient empirical studies showing that OMC processes, and namely 
the EES, return the responsibility of any adopted measure to the Member States. The 
process of (legal) harmonization or convergence takes place at national level rather 
than at supranational or European level even though the Commission clearly acts as a 
propeller. This is a rather different scenario from the one depicted by the Commission 
which  places  much  emphasis  on  the  alleged  association  of  accountability  with 
citizenship and participatory democracy whereby accountability is part of a continual 
process of ‘giving an account’ to an informed and active civic society. Democratic 
accountability of this type and more broadly participatory democracy within the EES 
has been said to be designed to control policy outcomes being prospective in character 
rather than solely retrospective. However, as I show elsewhere (Velluti 2009), the 
EES has been rather disappointing in relation to its much acclaimed bottom-to-top 
participatory democracy and democratic accountability. If we conceive of the EES as 
being largely intergovernmental as opposed to supranational, we may argue a fortiori
that  Member  States  may  be  held  accountable  (that  is,  within  the  framework  of 
classical  legal  and  political  accountability)  for  measures  taken  pursuant  to  the 
Employment Guidelines to their parliaments, irrespective of whether EC law is “soft” 
in nature. In other words, national measures adopted in the context of the EES would 
take a life of their own and become justiciable through domestic judicial procedures. 
Problems and paradoxes of European legal integration
European legal integration as a set of dynamic and contradictory processes
The  challenges  described  above  are  accentuated  by  the  existence  of  a  series  of 
inherent, intertwined and cumulative paradoxes and problems besetting the EU and its 
present and future existence. Each of these encapsulates a weakness or limitation of 
the European integration process, and can be found in part of the copious literature on 
New Governance. Depending on the ‘lens’ we use to analyze and interpret them and 
on the ‘solution’ employed to resolving these tensions and problems we may have 
different understandings of the strengths, limitations and role of experimentalist forms 
of governance in the EU. 
The  underlying  claim  is  that  ‘the  complexity  of  European  legal  integration 
processes can be understood neither by static concepts and descriptions nor by simply 
following the prescriptions offered by the legal categorizations of Europe issued from 
the ever-changing political agenda of European integration’ (Madsen et al 2008: 1). 
This  is  even  more  compelling  when  we  think  about  the  dramatic  expansion  of 
competences of the EU institutions through the dynamic and expansive approach of 
the ECJ and of the Commission towards Articles 28 and 30 EC. 
I therefore suggest rethinking European legal integration as a set of dynamic 
and even somewhat contradictory processes or put simply as being paradox-laden. EUSA 11
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Paradoxes  may  be  defined  as  a  set  of  tensions  or  conflicting  forces  which  are 
important drivers in the making of the EU (Madsen et al 2008: 1). In this section I 
focus mainly on two set of tensions and problems besetting the EU which I consider 
as  providing  a  good  ground  for  understanding  and  analyzing  some  of  the  major 
processes making up European legal integration. 
European legal integration as disintegration of national law
The objective here is to go beyond a narrow focus on harmonization and diversity in 
order to better understand and assess the implementation of and compliance with EU 
law. The first step in studying the processes by which law produces integration is to 
break  the  question  down  into  a  number  of  distinct  enquiries  (Nelken  2008).  For 
example, what are we studying when we explore legal culture as an object, vector or 
outcome of integration? Legal culture, in its most general meaning can be defined as 
‘one way of describing relatively stable patterns of legally oriented social behaviour 
and attitudes’ (Nelken 2004). In the specific legal culture embraces the body of laws, 
jurisprudence,  principles  and  values,  procedures  and  practices  of  a  given  polity. 
Culture is marked by hybridity and creolization rather than uniformity or consistency. 
Local systems are analyzed in the context of national and transnational processes and 
are understood as the result of particular historical trajectories. It follows that legal 
culture is a concept in fieri (Nelken 2008: 3003). 
Once we have taken into consideration legal culture it is necessary to look at 
integration  and  thus  another  set  of  questions  must  be  addressed.  What  is  being 
integrated, by whom, in what way, for which reasons and to achieve which results? It 
is also necessary to distinguish between national and transnational jurisdictions and 
common and civil law traditions. Further, what type of changes does integration (both 
as a means and as an end in itself) entail? And who or what does it affect? To what 
extent do institutions, constitutions, codes, principles and values, procedures, norms 
and practices change? How do we evaluate the degree of change? It is also interesting 
to  note  that  differences  between  legal  cultures  are  either  considered  as  being 
irreducible or on the contrary that they are not particularly deep, but contingent on 
practice or a given situation and that they may consequently change. In this latter 
context,  some  are  of  the  view  that  legal  cultures  are  discursively  constructed  or 
imagined and used only as a convenient excuse for avoiding changes in the way law is 
practiced within domestic legal systems (Nelken 2008: 300). 
In the current framework of postnational politics and relations, boundaries of 
law do not coincide with national jurisdictions and therefore laws will be contingent 
and vary on the basis of variations in the wider culture. Equally, the degree of legal 
integration  will  depend  on  what  is  being  integrated  and  the  reasons  for  such 
harmonization.  In  this  context,  much  of  the  literature  has  centred  mainly  on  the 
implementation of European Directives or Decisions. The focus of analysis has been 
on compliance in terms of new legislative or administrative measures or lack of them 
at  domestic  level  and  chiefly  from  the  perspective  of  the  European  Commission. 
Within  this framework Member  States  have been categorized  and subdivided into 
different groups depending on the degree of compliance with EU law. 
However, as argued by Nelken (2008: 302), integration is not always the result 
of deliberate design on the part of the European Commission, or a Member State or 
any  other  agent.  Moreover,  just  as  efforts  by  design  can  succeed  or  fail,  other 
processes that proceed independently, or even in opposition to these efforts, can have 
varying  or  unexpected  outcomes.  The  language  of  “implementation”  and EUSA 11
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“compliance” is likely to be less conceptually adequate for tracing these processes. 
Other  terms  or  metaphors  therefore  such  as  “interaction”,  “collision”,  “dialogue 
conflicts”, “convergence” or “diffusion” may be more apt to describe larger and more 
various  processes  taking  place  between  law  and  other  “sites”.  In  referring  to  the 
complex  relationship  between  law  and  other  sub-systems  such  as economics  and 
politics Teubner (1998) talks about “irritation” to describe the difficulty law has in 
communicating with practices of these other sub-systems of society and he argues that 
law may “irritate” them into unpredictable changes. 
Moreover, in relation to the implementation of and compliance with soft modes 
of  governance  there  are  methodological  problems  in  assessing  compliance  and  in 
particular to evaluate whether there is a causal link between the adoption of domestic 
measures and European soft law. 
In the light of this complex picture it seems unrealistic first to claim that legal 
systems merely represent a coherent set of formal legal norms and second to assume 
that  state,  group  or  individual  behaviour  could  ever  completely  conform  to 
international  commitments,  especially  as  global  pressures  are  ongoing  and 
changeable. Indeed, to cite Henkin’s (1968) classic observation: ‘almost all nations 
observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations 
almost  all  of  the  time’.  Further,  we  also  need to  keep  in  mind  that  there can  be 
disagreement  about  what  is  meant  by  and  who  should  define  integration  and 
compliance and thus it may be difficult or even inappropriate to theorize a generalized 
model of either harmonization and compliance. There would always have to be a 
certain degree of relativity and flexibility in measuring conformity and again take into 
account  what  is  being  integrated  and  for  what  purpose.  In  particular,  outside  the 
economic sphere of the European integration project and in situations where Member 
States see the requirements of integration as challenging features of their sovereignty 
or identity, they are going to be less prone to accept change. For example, candidate 
countries have been more willing to accept the terms of ‘conditionality’ and tolerate 
diversity. But this then raises the further difficult question of what sort of diversity the 
EU is pursuing. 
Finally, we have to consider “symbolic” change. At times it may receive wide 
acceptance provided it remains what it is, that is, symbolic, and does not encroach 
upon the constitutional values and principles and, more broadly, beliefs and lives of 
citizens.  At  other  times  it  is  precisely  the  symbolic  nature  of  the  changes  being 
proposed which is being rejected  – which may explain why the proposed defunct 
European  Constitutional  Treaty  or  European  “Constitution”  failed  and  why  a 
European “Treaty”, 
17 that is, the Lisbon Treaty may be more acceptable. 
The touch of ‘stateness’
In the literature on European integration there are a plethora of definitions of the EU 
such  as ‘supranational  federation’ (von  Bogdandy  1999),  ‘layered  international 
organisation’ (Curtin and Dekker 1999), ‘European Commonwealth’ (MacCormick 
1999),  system  of  ‘multilevel  constitutionalism’ (Pernice  1999) and  ‘multilevel 
governance’ (Hooghe  and  Marks  2001).  All  of  these  terms  to  a  different  degree
effectively capture the sui generis nature of the EU as an ever-changing, dynamic, 
multi-tiered and hybrid post-national polity and its paradoxical relationship with the 
state. The EU is simultaneously both ‘near-state’ and antithetical to ‘stateness’ (Shaw 
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and Wiener, 2000); the Union is clearly less than a state but also clearly more than a 
classical  international  organization  (Weiler  1995).  As  Shaw  and  Wiener  (2000) 
illustrate EU law reflects this “betweenness”: while “the letter of the law” has never 
made explicit reference to the concept of stateness, the “spirit of the law” which has 
guided  the  generation  of  the  leading  constitutional  principles  of  direct  effect and 
supremacy of EU law is shaped by it. As Nicolaïdis (2007: 683) eloquently puts it: the 
‘EU is built on the quicksand of archetypes, the construct of lawyers and political 
scientists fighting the twin perils of a post-modern Napoleonic vision of a harmonized 
continent and a Westphalian nostalgia for absolute sovereign autonomy’. It follows 
that EU law cannot be fully analyzed using the tools of either international law or 
national law, but only with a combination of the two. On this point Ladeur (2008: 
159) notes that while the concept of “supranationality” has been conceived as being 
open-ended and entailing experimentalism it has gradually been revisited in a more 
“state-centred perspective” ‘on a kind of “super-state” in spite of the fact that this runs 
counter to the new relational logic of societal self-organization and its open dynamic 
of  self-transformation’.  Member  States  too  have  been  witnessing deep  changes  in 
their systems of governance taking into consideration diversity. And yet it seems that 
the  ‘EU  is  associated  with  more  centralization,  more  hierarchy  and  more 
harmonization’. Ladeur uses the example of subsidiarity as illustrating this state of 
affairs: rather than being a principle for preserving Member States’ sovereignty it is 
used as an instrument for ensuring efficiency of problem-solving strategies. Hence for 
this  scholar  ‘new  “constitutionalism”  returns  to  the  traditional  state  logic  of  the 
nineteenth century’. 
18
The afore-mentioned “betweenness” translates into further complex conundrums. For 
instance, with regard to the long-standing debate about the democratic deficit of the 
EU, the “No Demos” thesis accentuates and aggravates the problem since it means 
that  even  the  modest  gains  in  the  power  of  the  European Parliament  over  the 
decisional process cannot contribute to resolving the democratic dilemma since absent 
a  “European  Demos”  the  European  Parliament  cannot  enjoy  full  independent 
authority or legitimacy as a rule making body in the EU system. In this strict sense, 
the ‘fundamental paradox of constitutionalism is that a constituting “demos” is needed 
in  order  to  produce a constitution  that  will  in  turn  consolidate  (if  not  create)  the 
constituted “demos”’ (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2008: 32 and 40; see also Weiler 
2002).  However,  as  Weiler  (1995)  points  out  in  the  EU  “demos”  should  not  be 
equated exclusively to “volk” nor should the EU be considered to be in some statal 
form as the terms “Staat” and “Staatentruct” express or that it is a state in the making. 
Weiler (1995) invites us to rethink the analytical tools for studying the EU in order to 
depart from the organic cultural homogeneous terms of the unity of “Volk-Nation-
State-Citizenship” and consider other understandings of “demos” which may lead to 
different  conceptualizations and potentialities for  the  EU envisioning a “European 
civic, value-driven demos” co-existing side by side with a national organic-cultural 
one. ‘It would be more than ironic if a polity set up as a means to counter the excesses 
of statism ended up coming round full circle and transforming itself into a (super) 
state. It would be equally ironic if the ethos which rejected the boundary abuse of the 
nation-state, gave birth to a polity with the same potential for abuse. The problem 
with this “Unity vision” is that its very realization entails its negation’ (Weiler 1995). 
Note, too, that decoupling volk from demos and demos from state, in whole or in part, 
                                                
18 See also the critique of the White Paper on European Governance by Joerges, Mény and Weiler 
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does not entail a rejection of the values of nationality. The decoupling of nationality 
and  citizenship  opens the  possibility,  instead, of  thinking of  co-existing “multiple 
demoi” enabling people to aspire and live both as nationals of a Member State and 
European  citizens  particularly in  cases  where  there  are  affinities  to  shared  values 
which transcend the ethno-national diversity and have a more European dimension 
(Weiler 1995).
Linked to this there is also another problem concerning the increase in power of 
the European Parliament. Members of the European Parliament are directly elected in 
their Member States, and large Member States are represented by more members than 
small Member States. Therefore, from the point of view of the EU as a whole, more 
power  to  the  European  Parliament  does  seem  to  be  a  step  in  a  more  democratic 
direction. Viewed from a more national angle, however, at least when it comes to the 
smaller Member States, increased power to the European Parliament might not be 
seen as a democratic development. The alleged democratic deficit of the EU has been 
addressed  in  different  ways:  a.  with  the  setting  up  and  further  development  of 
coordination processes such as the EES (thus focusing on more putatively deliberative 
forms of democracy); b. with the so-called “citizens’ initiative” provided for by the 
defunct Constitutional Treaty (Article I-47(4)) and maintained by the Reform Treaty 
(Article 11(4) TEU and Article 24 TFEU) (introducing a form of direct democracy at 
European level), c. and with the setting up of an “Early Warning system” which gives 
an  important  role  to  national  parliaments  in  the  rule-making  process  of  the  EU 
(supposedly strengthening representative democracy). 
19 The citizens’ initiative and 
the early warning system could breathe new life into the democratic functioning of the 
EU. However, it is unclear what their ‘added value’ may be as the Reform Treaty 
provisions do not offer much clarity in terms of their operation in practice and some 
commentators have already emphasized the type of problems which we may be faced 
with (Ippolito 2007; Dougan 2008). In referring to the provisions on the citizens’ 
initiative Dougan (2008: 940) argues that the ‘Court could also find itself playing a 
crucial role in defining the political quality and democratic potential of these new 
provisions’ and that ‘judicial engagement with the novelty of direct democracy within 
the Union might well build new synergies in the Court’s conceptions of participation 
and citizenship – and thereby enrich its own distinctive contribution to the ongoing 
debate about how to enhance the Union’s frail popular legitimacy’.
Bridging the Gaps between New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism
At this juncture we need to return to the initial question posed by and included in the 
title of this paper: are New Governance and constitutionalism friends or foes? To 
some this may be a rhetorical question carrying no great weight the answer being 
unequivocally that they are friends. This is either because as shown in part in this 
paper experimental modes of regulation are not an entirely new phenomenon and also 
because  as  argued  here  the  reason  for  their  existence  is  the  same  as  that  of 
hard/classical  modes  of  regulation,  that  is,  the  furthering  of  European  integration 
                                                
19 Under the Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments have been given an important role in the safeguard of 
the subsidiarity  principle  and  have been involved  in  the EU's  decision-making process  when draft 
legislative  proposals  concern  areas  of  shared  competence.  National  parliaments  may  receive  draft 
legislative proposals directly from EU institutions and, if an infringement of subsidiarity is detected, 
they may send a “reasoned opinion” to the Commission, the European Parliament, or the Council. This 
triggers  the  “early  warning  mechanism”  aimed  at  the  review  of  such  a  proposal.  If  ultimately 
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independently  of  whether  there  is  a  clearly  designed  integrationist  telos.  In  this 
context there is growing empirical research which shows that hybridity has already 
been applied to different policy domains in the EU for quite some time and that in 
some instances this regulatory mix has also borne fruits (e.g. Sabel and Zeitlin 2008; 
de Búrca and Scott 2007). 
At  the  same  time,  the  paper  has  shown  throughout  that  New  Governance 
presents  significant  practical  and  conceptual  challenges  for  the  Community  legal 
order, for  our understanding of  law and legal processes and ideas such as that of 
democracy  and  self-government  which  are  embedded  in  the  concept  of 
constitutionalism.  The  very  existence  of  these  problems  explains  why  New 
Governance is a phenomenon that can no longer be disregarded by legal scholars who 
are called to rethink in a meaningful way the roles of law and constitutionalism in the 
wider EU context. In addition, we have seen that there are a series of paradoxes and 
tensions with which the EU is constantly confronted. It may also be argued that the 
challenges posed by New Governance mirror or reflect inherent problems concerning 
constitutionalism and law both at European and national levels. The se problems to a 
certain extent may be explained by globalization processes but may also be seen as 
the result of dynamic and evolving trajectories of history and international relations. 
The above should not lead us to the conclusion that New Governance is a foe of 
EU constitutionalism either. However, this situation does invite us to rethink current 
understandings of the nature of these problems and challenges and to reconsider how 
hybridity may be used as a workable regulatory model. Embarking upon this exercise 
is not an easy task as there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the challenges facing the 
EU. As Poiares Maduro (2003: 76) states ‘the paradoxical character of constitutional 
concepts determines that there are no ideal solutions and that different polities and/or 
institutions may come closer to constitutional ideals in different real-life settings’. No 
standard  regulations  can  effectively  govern  the  multiplicity  of  sites  in  which  the 
multi-tiered  system  of  the  EU  operates.  The  transnationalization  of  governance 
requires legal institutions themselves to be multiple and diverse. One advantage of 
hybridization is that rather than focusing on legislation, implementation, enforcement, 
and adjudication as separate stages it conceives them in a more holistic manner, that 
is, as being part of the same process and it thus seeks to establish dynamic interactions 
between them.
The firs step is therefore the eschewal of onedirectional positivist and statal 
approaches to law and constitutionalism based on unity and hierarchy. In particular, 
we  should  start  from  the  premise  that  new  modes  of  governance  reflect  a  deep 
transformation of the nation-state, a shift towards a postnational era in which the EU 
has  emerged  as  the  nation-states’ changing  self.  Ladeur  (1997:  43)  argues  that 
conceptions of hierarchical, centralized and unitary states ignore the extent to which 
processes of differentiation and pluralization in decision-making have transformed the 
“state  from within”.  There is  a  need,  therefore, to  develop  a model  of  regulation
which  takes  into  account the  peculiarities  and  realities  of  the  EU  system.  In  this 
context, metaconstitutionalism enables us to assign law with a renewed role. On this 
point Armstrong (1998) rightly posits that law has generally been conceived of as 
being mainly instrumentalist, particularly as a medium by which the ECJ has pursued 
a  pro-integrationist  agenda.  ‘Allied  to  this  instrumentalist  images  of  law  is  an 
assumption of law’s ability to deliver integration both in terms of the integration of 
the national and the Community legal orders and in respect of law’s ability to deliver 
social, political and economic integration’ (Armstrong 1998: 156). The most enduring EUSA 11
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manifestation of this view has been the image of the “constitutionalized Treaty”. 
20 It 
is therefore necessary to revisit the concept of law in order to combine the use of law 
as a “medium” with that of law as an “institution” encompassing the organizational, 
procedural, substantive and normative elements of law. As already observed above 
law retains an important problem-solving capacity and symbolic authority and the 
problems of coordination and legitimacy of the current multifarious and multi-tiered 
EU system are on such a scale that law, with its traditionally vast regulatory potential, 
continues to be an invaluable means of containing and resolving crises (Walker 2000:
12). Hence, law's function is not solely prescriptive but also becomes facilitative and 
reconstitutive  (Stewart  1986)  providing  for  a  set  of  rules  about  the  procedure, 
organization, and constitution of other social fields and subsystems. In this sense law 
should enable a 'harmonious fit' between institutional structures and social structures 
rather than influence the social structures themselves (Teubner 1988). Law, therefore, 
continues to play a significant role through its capacity to coordinate among different 
social  institutions  (e.g.,  political,  economic etc.) but  it  is  no  longer  based  on  the 
narrow  and  traditional conception  of  law as  top-down,  prescriptive and  universal. 
Law's coordinating function is based on its retained “Kompetenz-Kompetenz” role 
(“competence  competency”),  that  is,  the  competence  to  determine  other  actors' 
competencies. The legal system discerns the capacities of different actors, arenas and 
subsystems,  defines  and  allocates  responsibilities  among  them  and  their  self-
regulatory  institutional  processes.  Its  jurisdictional  role  should  be  seen  in  this 
reconstitutive context, one which also gives voice to the different actors who actively 
participate  in  the  multi-tiered  system  of  the  EU.  This  approach  would  also  bring 
representation  and  participation  closer  to  one  another  giving  a  renewed  and
strengthened value to Union citizenship. The hybrid model of governance  broadly 
outlined here follows a very similar theoretical pattern as the one that Poiares Maduro 
(2003) has termed as “counterpunctual law” which aims at preserving the identity of 
national legal orders while at the same time promoting their inclusiveness within the 
EU system. 
While this model has clear advantages from the perspective of regulation and 
democracy  the  growth  in  legal  pluralism  and  experimental  approaches  to  EU 
governance, however, has destabilizing effects and creates a series of problems to law 
as  an  institution.  National  and  European  courts  are  forced  to  adjudicate  conflicts 
between a broader range of actors engaged in rule-making processes. It remains to be 
seen what the role of the judiciary will be given that New Governance processes often 
operate beyond formal structures (Scott and Sturm 2007; Cichowski 2007). Moreover, 
and linked to this, the quests for the recognition of practices and processes taking 
place outside or beside the classic Community Method re-bring to surface the issue of 
standing before the ECJ in actions of annulment of Community legislation and in the 
future the ECJ may be forced to adapt or develop procedural rules on legal standing 
and constitutional norms in respect  of representation to deal with these problems. 
Hence,  once again the ECJ is forced to confront itself with the evolving political 
realities of EU governance (Armstrong 1998: 171).
21
Hence, whilst hybridity models enable the EU to coexist within a multi-tiered 
structure and to live with paradox they also leave us with the difficulty of reconciling 
                                                
20 See  the  language  used  by  the  ECJ  in  Case  294/83,  Parti  Ecologiste  ‘Les  Verts’  v  European 
Parliament [1986] ECR 1339; Opinion 1/91, Draft Agreement on a European Economic Area [1991] 
ECR I-6084. 
21 This has already happened with the inclusion of the CoR among the applicants who have standing 
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the often opposing needs of economic efficiency with democracy and accountability, 
expert knowledge  with  public  involvement and representation  with  participation 
across different policy domains. However, the challenge of this enterprise could be 
used productively insofar as we do not search for overarching solutions which often 
fail to grasp the whole picture of a problem and engage instead with the reality of EU 
decision-making.
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